Environmental Penalties Against Enterprises and Employees: Labor Contracts and Cost-Shifting in the Czech Republic&ast
Comparative Economic Studies, 1996, vol. 38, issue 4, 34 pages
This paper examines the enforcement of environmental protection laws under communism and democracy, while exploring the possibilities for cost-shifting between Czech enterprises and their employees as offered by labor contracts. Theory establishes the connection between cost-shifting possibilities and the efficient rule for enforcing water protection laws when the actions of enterprises and their employees combine to cause water-damaging accidents (for example, oil spills). For the years 1988 to 1991, analysis of labor arrangements in the Czech Republic discerns the apparently efficient rule for the communist and democratic periods, while statistical analysis discerns the operative enforcement rule in each period.
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