Environmental Penalties Against Enterprises and Employees: Labor Contracts and Cost-Shifting in the Czech Republic&ast

Dietrich Earnhart

Comparative Economic Studies, 1996, vol. 38, issue 4, 34 pages

Abstract: This paper examines the enforcement of environmental protection laws under communism and democracy, while exploring the possibilities for cost-shifting between Czech enterprises and their employees as offered by labor contracts. Theory establishes the connection between cost-shifting possibilities and the efficient rule for enforcing water protection laws when the actions of enterprises and their employees combine to cause water-damaging accidents (for example, oil spills). For the years 1988 to 1991, analysis of labor arrangements in the Czech Republic discerns the apparently efficient rule for the communist and democratic periods, while statistical analysis discerns the operative enforcement rule in each period.

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v38/n4/pdf/ces199637a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v38/n4/full/ces199637a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:compes:v:38:y:1996:i:4:p:1-34

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/41294/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Comparative Economic Studies is currently edited by Nauro Campos

More articles in Comparative Economic Studies from Palgrave Macmillan, Association for Comparative Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().