Market-Based Fiscal Discipline Under Evolving Decentralisation: The Case of Russian Regions

Andrey Timofeev

Comparative Economic Studies, 2007, vol. 49, issue 2, 177-200

Abstract: Subnational governments' access to credit is essential for smoothing out shocks to their revenue and expenditures, including those associated with large infrastructure projects. However, governments might pursue an unsustainable borrowing path unless they face appropriate incentives. Theoretically, credit markets can discourage excessive borrowing by charging risk premia rising with the level of indebtedness. We examine the robustness of this market mechanism under the evolving institutions of decentralised governance in a transitional country. Russia presents a perfect case for such analysis, for the market discipline was the only constraint on subnational borrowing there throughout the 1990s. Comparative Economic Studies (2007) 49, 177–200. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ces.8100188

Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v49/n2/pdf/8100188a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/v49/n2/full/8100188a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:compes:v:49:y:2007:i:2:p:177-200

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... cs/journal/41294/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Comparative Economic Studies is currently edited by Nauro Campos

More articles in Comparative Economic Studies from Palgrave Macmillan, Association for Comparative Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().