Central Bank Independence Before and After the Crisis
Jakob Haan (),
Raymond Hicks and
Sylvester Eijffinger ()
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Jakob Haan: University of Groningen
Christina Bodea: Michigan State University
Raymond Hicks: Princeton University
Comparative Economic Studies, 2018, vol. 60, issue 2, 183-202
Abstract This paper discusses whether central bank independence (CBI) has changed since the financial crisis. Central banks’ quasi-fiscal policies during and after the crisis, and macro-prudential and unconventional monetary policies, which are more redistributive than traditional monetary policy, have led to questions about the desirability of CBI. Some even argue that CBI is under threat. However, a survey among central bankers and updates of legal proxies for CBI do not provide strong evidence that CBI has diminished since the financial crisis. The only indication for this is the increase in the turnover rate of central bank governors in advanced countries.
Keywords: Central bank independence; Central bank accountability; Unconventional monetary policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 E52 E42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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