Privatization Rarely in Public or National Interest
Kwame Sundaram Jomo () and
Anis Chowdhury ()
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Kwame Sundaram Jomo: Khazanah Research Institute
Anis Chowdhury: Western Sydney University
Development, 2018, vol. 61, issue 1, 84-88
Abstract:
Abstract Privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) has been a key plank of the neo-liberal counter-revolution against economic development since the 1980s. Privatization’s promoters promised improved efficiency and improved fiscal balances, both supposedly contributing to higher economic growth. Privatization was also supposed to ensure improved consumer welfare through increased competition and lower prices. Empirical support for these claims is scant and often contradictory. Thus, in many cases, privatization has been worse as a solution to the ills it purported to overcome. The problems of SOEs are not necessarily due to public ownership per se. In any case, there are alternative governance, management and organization means to improve SOE performance without privatization.
Keywords: Neoliberal; State-owned enterprise; Profit; World Bank; IMF (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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DOI: 10.1057/s41301-018-0187-0
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