Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance

Amihai Glazer and Esko Niskanen
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Esko Niskanen: Government Institute for Economic Research, P.O. Box 269, Helsinki, Finland

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 1992, vol. 17, issue 2, 137-145

Abstract: Consumers who believe that government will provide them with some public medical care, even if they did not purchase medical insurance, may choose to purchase no such insurance. The amount of medical care consumed will then be less than the first-best optimum. Under specified conditions government can then increase the welfare of consumers by subsidizing insurance, or by providing public health care at a more generous level than the minimum it would otherwise give. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1992) 17, 137–145. doi:10.1007/BF00962710

Date: 1992
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Working Paper: COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE (1991)
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