A Model of an Oligopoly in an Insurance Market

Mattias K Polborn

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 1998, vol. 23, issue 1, 48 pages

Abstract: This article analyzes the behavior of an oligopoly of risk-averse insurers that insure many consumers facing identical independent risks; however, the probability of a loss is ex ante not known with certainty. It is shown that there is a continuum of equilibria in the Bertrand game. The most plausible equilibrium can be obtained by requiring that all insurers are content with the number of policies they sell given the equilibrium premium. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (1998) 23, 41–48. doi:10.1023/A:1008677913887

Date: 1998
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