The Consequences for a Monopolistic Insurance Firm of Evaluating Risk Better than Customers: The Adverse Selection Hypothesis Reversed
Bertrand Villeneuve
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2000, vol. 25, issue 1, 65-79
Abstract:
This article models a situation in which a monopolistic insurer evaluates risk better than its customers. The resulting equilibrium allocations are compared to the consequences of the standard adverse selection hypothesis. On the positive side, they exhibit the property that low-risk people are better covered than higher-risk people. On the normative side, the article shows that there are two reasons for avoiding excessive risk classification: one is the classical destruction of insurance possibilities, and the other comes from the distrustful atmosphere generated by new asymmetric information. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (2000) 25, 65–79. doi:10.1023/A:1008749524517
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v25/n1/pdf/grir2000122a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v25/n1/full/grir2000122a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:genrir:v:25:y:2000:i:1:p:65-79
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10713
Access Statistics for this article
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review is currently edited by Michael Hoy and Nicolas Treich
More articles in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review from Palgrave Macmillan, International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().