Will Private Health Insurance Make the Distribution of Public Health Subsidies More Equal? The Case of India

Ajay Mahal

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2003, vol. 28, issue 2, 160 pages

Abstract: This paper assesses the impact of the entry of private players in the health insurance market on the size of the insurance market and the distribution of public health subsidies on health care provision in India. Simulation results presented in the paper suggest that the redistributive effect is small when richer groups have privileged access to public facilities. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory (2003) 28, 131–160. doi:10.1023/A:1026392821297

Date: 2003
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