Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

Luigi Buzzacchi and Tommaso Valletti
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Luigi Buzzacchi: Politecnico di Torino and CERAP–Università Bocconi, DSPEA, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 24, 10129 Torino, Italy, e-mail: luigi.buzzacchi@polito.it

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2005, vol. 30, issue 1, 97 pages

Abstract: This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer's type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2005) 30, 71–97. doi:10.1007/s10836-005-1110-7

Date: 2005
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