Optimal insurance contract under a value-at-risk constraint
Hung-Hsi Huang
Additional contact information
Hung-Hsi Huang: Department of Business Administration, Southern Taiwan University of Technology, No. 1, Nan-Tai Street, Yung-Kang, Taiwan, e-mail: d86723002@ntu.edu.tw
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2006, vol. 31, issue 2, 110 pages
Abstract:
This study develops an optimal insurance contract endogenously under a value-at-risk (VaR) constraint. Although Wang et al. [2005] had examined this problem, their assumption implied that the insured is risk neutral. Consequently, this study extends Wang et al. [2005] and further considers a more realistic situation where the insured is risk averse. The study derives the optimal insurance contract as a single deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is redundant or as a double deductible insurance when the VaR constraint is binding. Finally, this study discusses the optimal coverage level from common forms of insurances, including deductible insurance, upper-limit insurance, and proportional coinsurance. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2006) 31, 91–110. doi:10.1007/s10713-006-0557-5
Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v31/n2/pdf/grir2006189a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/grir/journal/v31/n2/full/grir2006189a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:genrir:v:31:y:2006:i:2:p:91-110
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10713
Access Statistics for this article
The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review is currently edited by Michael Hoy and Nicolas Treich
More articles in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review from Palgrave Macmillan, International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().