On Optimal Insurance in the Presence of Moral Hazard&ast

Edi Karni

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2008, vol. 33, issue 1, 18 pages

Abstract: This paper expounds on the importance of identifiabilty of subjective probabilities in agency theory with moral hazard. An application to insurance is examined. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2008) 33, 1–18. doi:10.1057/grir.2008.7

Date: 2008
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