The Role of Repetition and Observability in Deterring Insurance Fraud

Michal Krawczyk

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2009, vol. 34, issue 1, 74-87

Abstract: In this paper, I analyze an inspection game between an insurer and an infinite sequence of policyholders, who can try to misrepresent relevant information in order to obtain coverage or lower insurance premium. Because claim-auditing is costly for the insurer, ex-post moral hazard problem arises. I find that the repeated game effect serves as a commitment device, allowing the insurer to deter fraud completely (for sufficiently high discount rate) but only when the policyholders observe past auditing strategies. Under weaker observability conditions, only partial efficiency gains are generally possible. I conclude that the insurers should spend resources on signaling their anti-fraud attempts to the potential policyholders. Similar conclusions can be drawn with respect to conceptually similar problems, such as tax evasion. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2009) 34, 74–87. doi:10.1057/grir.2009.1

Date: 2009
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