New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance

Wanda Mimra () and Achim Wambach
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Wanda Mimra: Center of Economic Research, ETH Zurich, Zuerichbergstrasse 18, Zuerich, 8092 Switzerland.

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2014, vol. 39, issue 2, 136-152

Abstract: We provide an overview of the paths taken to understand existence and efficiency of equilibrium in competitive insurance markets with adverse selection since the seminal work by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). A stream of recent work reconsiders the strategic foundations of competitive equilibrium by carefully modelling the market game.

Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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