Information Problems in Bancassurance: Empirical Evidence Based on a Comparison Between Over-the-Counter and Telephone Marketing Customers

Jin-Lung Peng () and Kili C Wang ()
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Jin-Lung Peng: 1] Department of Risk Management and Insurance, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan[2] Risk and Insurance Research Center, College of Commerce, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.
Kili C Wang: 1] Risk and Insurance Research Center, College of Commerce, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan.

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2015, vol. 40, issue 2, 102-132

Abstract: We investigate the problem of asymmetric information among the different distribution channels of bancassurance, namely, over-the-counter (OTC) selling and telephone marketing (TM). We predict that the bank could bring an information advantage to insurance companies through TM by providing a customer list based on the customers' records in the bank. Bancassurance can play a role of integrating the information that is transferred from the bank to the insurance company. Our empirical evidence shows that, in contrast to OTC customers, there is less evidence of adverse selection, and there is also less evidence of moral hazard or fraud among the TM customers that have been sorted by the bank. This phenomenon could be attributed to the valuable private information provided by the credit records of customers kept by the bank.

Date: 2015
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