EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Can an actuarially unfair tontine be optimal?

Carole Bernard (), Marco Feliciangeli () and Steven Vanduffel ()
Additional contact information
Carole Bernard: Grenoble Ecole de Management (GEM)
Marco Feliciangeli: Department of Economics and Political Sciences at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)
Steven Vanduffel: Department of Economics and Political Sciences at Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB)

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, 2025, vol. 50, issue 1, No 3, 39-71

Abstract: Abstract A one-period tontine is a collective investment fund in which every participant enters with an initial contribution, but only those participants who are still alive at maturity are entitled to receive a share of the total fund value. A vast literature proposes various sharing rules, primarily using actuarial fairness of the payout as the main criterion, i.e., the sharing is structured in a way that participants have the same (unconditional) expected return. We revisit this point and suggest alternative sharing rules aimed at better suiting investors. Specifically, we discuss how to share mortality risk using equality in expected utility among participants as our fairness criterion. A key finding is that, in a competitive market, only actuarially fair tontines are viable.

Keywords: Tontine; Actuarial fairness; Sabin rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s10713-024-00102-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:genrir:v:50:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-024-00102-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10713

DOI: 10.1057/s10713-024-00102-y

Access Statistics for this article

The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review is currently edited by Michael Hoy and Nicolas Treich

More articles in The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review from Palgrave Macmillan, International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-09
Handle: RePEc:pal:genrir:v:50:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s10713-024-00102-y