Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard and the Insurance of Legal Expenses&ast

Roger Bowles and Neil Rickman
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Roger Bowles: School of Social Sciences, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 1998, vol. 23, issue 2, 196-209

Date: 1998
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