Rational Pension Reform
Axel Börsch-Supan ()
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Axel Börsch-Supan: [1] Mannheim Institute for the Economics of Aging (MEA), Universit&aauml;t Mannheim, Mannheim D-68131, Germany.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 2007, vol. 32, issue 4, 430-446
Abstract:
This paper is motivated by the idea to create, wherever possible, rational mechanisms that adapt pension systems automatically to a changed economic and demographic environment, rather than to leave such adaptations to discretionary high-profile pension reforms, which all too often stir political opposition. The paper delineates the theory behind such rational mechanisms, shows the advantages and limits of “self-stabilizing” pension systems, and compares the Swedish and the German approaches to rule-bound pension policy. The Geneva Papers (2007) 32, 430–446. doi:10.1057/palgrave.gpp.2510149
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:gpprii:v:32:y:2007:i:4:p:430-446
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