Economic and Monetary Union in Europe and Constraints on National Budgetary Policies

Lans Bovenberg, Jeroen J. M. Kremers and Paul Masson
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Jeroen J. M. Kremers: International Monetary Fund

IMF Staff Papers, 1991, vol. 38, issue 2, 374-398

Abstract: The pros and cons of institutionalized constraints limiting the freedom of national budgetary policies within an economic and monetary union in Europe are reviewed. The issue is approached from three angles: the influence of EMU on budget discipline, intergenerational equity and intertemporal efficiency, and macroeconomic stabilization. The desirability of constraints on budgetary policy is related to the arrangements for EMU-wide monetary policy, the credibility of a no-bailout clause among member states, and progress in the area of supply-side policies.

JEL-codes: E62 F33 H6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1991
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