Macroeconomic Conditions and Pressures for Protection under Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws: Empirical Evidence from the United States

Michael P. Leidy
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Michael P. Leidy: International Monetary Fund

IMF Staff Papers, 1997, vol. 44, issue 1, 132-144

Abstract: Antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) procedures are governed by specific rules requiring both injury (by reason of imports) and dumping/subsidies, and thus might be expected to be less susceptible to pressures for protection arising from cyclical movements in the domestic macroeconomy. This paper investigates whether there is a connection between the state of domestic macroeconomic activity and pressures for protection under AD/CVD. Not unlike other forms of protection, the evidence suggests that pressures for protection under AD/CVD have advanced during periods of macroeconomic weakness and receded during periods of macroeconomic strength.

JEL-codes: F1 F4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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