The Complier Pays Principle: The Limits of Fiscal Approaches Toward Sustainable Forest Management

By Luc Leruth, Remi Paris and Ivan Ruzicka
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By Luc Leruth: International Monetary Fund
Remi Paris: International Monetary Fund
Ivan Ruzicka: International Monetary Fund

IMF Staff Papers, 2001, vol. 48, issue 2, 8

Abstract: This paper examines the role and impact of taxation on sustainable forest management. It is shown that fiscal instruments neither reinforce nor substitute for traditional regulatory approaches and can actually undermine sustainability. The paper uses the reasoning at the root of the Faustmann solution to draw conclusions on the incentives for sustainable tropical forest exploitation. It proposes a bond mechanism as an alternative market-based instrument to encourage sustainable forest logging while reducing monitoring costs. Copyright 2001, International Monetary Fund

JEL-codes: H39 Q23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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