Merging banks in time of crisis

Ioannis Kokkoris

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2014, vol. 15, issue 3-4, 313-324

Abstract: During the peak of the crisis but also in the aftermath, it has been argued that there is a trade-off between competition and financial stability. Financial entities in distress have incentives to incur excessive risks and must be restrained in this tendency that characterises them. Competition and prudential regulation are both aiming at ensuring that financial markets will work effectively, and financial stability will be ensured. The premise behind the analysis presented herein is that competition authorities should be pragmatic in identifying and responding to instances where financial stability has to take priority in relation to competition policy. The article does not purport to argue though that competition policy should in general be set aside at times of financial crisis.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jbr/journal/v15/n3-4/pdf/jbr201415a.pdf Link to full text PDF (application/pdf)
http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jbr/journal/v15/n3-4/full/jbr201415a.html Link to full text HTML (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:15:y:2014:i:3-4:p:313-324

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/41261/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking Regulation is currently edited by Dalvinder Singh

More articles in Journal of Banking Regulation from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().