EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A note on the adequacy of the EU scheme for bank recovery, resolution and deposit insurance in Spain

Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado, Antonio Partal-Ureña and Antonio Trujillo-Ponce ()
Additional contact information
Pilar Gómez-Fernández-Aguado: Department of Financial Economics and Accounting, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Antonio Partal-Ureña: Department of Financial Economics and Accounting, Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Antonio Trujillo-Ponce: Department of Financial Economics and Accounting, Universidad Pablo de Olavide

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2016, vol. 17, issue 4, 332-337

Abstract: Abstract This article analyzes whether the funds set by the recent EU directives on bank resolution and deposit insurance to create a safer and sounder financial sector (that is, 1 and 0.8 per cent of covered deposits, respectively) are adequate to cover unexpected losses for the Spanish banking system. By applying a framework based on the foundation internal ratings-based approach established in Basel Capital Accords, we find that the fixed target levels proposed by the EU bank rules would not ensure the highest credit quality for a bank resolution and deposit insurance Fund in Spain. Nevertheless, these resources would be sufficient to ensure a good solvency level for the Fund, equivalent to an AA S&P rating in 2013.

Keywords: deposit insurance system; resolution funds; capital adequacy; internal ratings-based approach (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/jbr.2015.29 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:17:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1057_jbr.2015.29

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/41261/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking Regulation is currently edited by Dalvinder Singh

More articles in Journal of Banking Regulation from Palgrave Macmillan
Series data maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2017-09-29
Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:17:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1057_jbr.2015.29