Impact of the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) on the Italian financial market: Evidence from bank bonds

Alfonso Giudice ()
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Alfonso Giudice: Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2017, vol. 18, issue 3, No 4, 256-267

Abstract: Abstract The adoption of the European directive for Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID, Law n. 164/2007) introduced a change in Italian securities laws. The MiFID’s key objectives are market efficiency, integrity and fairness. The directive introduced measures to increase the market integration and liquidity of secondary markets to reach efficiency and integrity goals. In turn, banks and financial firms are asked to operate according to a general duty of fairness and honesty, with particular attention to the identification, prevention, management and disclosure of conflicts of interest. These rules should improve investor protection in the Italian financial market, which is historically characterized by a lower degree of market competition and a lower level of investor education. I collected financial information from 1283 bank bond prospectuses issued in the 2005–2010 period. I found that before MiFID adoption, bank bonds were issued at a negative spread with respect to the comparable risk-free rate, thus violating the diligence and fairness duties of the banks while acting as protective gatekeepers for their customers. After MiFID adoption, the bank bond spread became positive. However, investor protection was enhanced because of the higher competition in the bond market rather than because of the higher public surveillance of the fairness duties of the issuers.

Keywords: investor protection; MiFID; Bank bond (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G18 G21 G24 G28 G32 G34 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-016-0035-7

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