Can Federal Home Loan Banks effectively self-regulate lending to influential banks?

James Cash Acrey (), Wayne Y. Lee () and Timothy J. Yeager ()
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James Cash Acrey: University of Arkansas
Wayne Y. Lee: University of Arkansas
Timothy J. Yeager: University of Arkansas

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2019, vol. 20, issue 2, No 6, 197-210

Abstract: Abstract In principle, the threat of partial or full revocation of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System’s charter by Congress should limit advances (collateralized loans) by FHLBs to member banks with high risks of failure that increase potential losses to the Deposit Insurance Fund. In practice, even as the risk of insolvency became apparent in the financial crisis, FHLBs renewed and in some cases increased lending to several large-bank members that eventually failed. We argue FHLBs continue to lend to large risky members both because the cooperative structure enables these banks to exert significant influence over their FHLBs, and because the risk of insolvency can be difficult to assess. Policy makers should consider regulatory or supervisory measures that limit the use of advances by large-bank members.

Keywords: Federal Home Loan Bank; FHLB; Advances; Bank failure; Moral hazard; Financial crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 H25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-018-0082-3

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