The complexity of bank regulation: audit requirements in the USA

Drew Dahl and Larry Sherrer
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Larry Sherrer: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2019, vol. 20, issue 3, No 6, 286-289

Abstract: Abstract We use requirements governing external audits in the US banking industry as a case study to illustrate the complexity of regulatory structure. Complexity reflects a flexibility that has been used to “tailor” regulations for particular categories of banks. But it appears to conflict with recent proposals to “rationalize” a system that is said to lack coherence.

Keywords: Bank regulatory structure; Regulatory reform; Bank auditing; FDICIA (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-018-0091-2

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