Regulation of short-term consumer credits

Tuomas Takalo

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2019, vol. 20, issue 4, No 6, 348-354

Abstract: Abstract The regulation of short-term consumer credit markets is heatedly debated around the world. This article uses economic research as a basis for a qualitative assessment of the regulation of the short-term consumer credit market and discusses the experience of the recent regulations implemented in Finland. According to research, the interest rate ceiling is an inefficient way of regulating the short-term consumer credit market. In contrast, the regulations should be based on price transparency and results from behavioral economics.

Keywords: Banking regulation; Interest rate caps; Payday lending; Credit markets; Financial stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-019-00098-w

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