Portfolio analysis of big US banks’ performance: the fee business lines factor
Christian Calmès () and
Raymond Théoret ()
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Christian Calmès: Université du Québec (Outaouais)
Raymond Théoret: Université du Québec (Outaouais)
Journal of Banking Regulation, 2021, vol. 22, issue 2, No 2, 112-132
Abstract:
Abstract Fee business lines are often considered more volatile than loan business and characterized by an unfavourable risk–return trade-off. However, using FDIC samples from 2001 to 2016, we find that non-interest income still contributes positively to the performance of US banks—without impairing their solvability. On the one hand, our portfolio analysis suggests that the Big 4 seem to benefit from non-interest income, although their rescue of investment banks might not yet be profitable. We also find that trading, loan sales and securitization add flexibility in bank risk management. On the other hand, our results also suggest that the post-crisis regulation appears detrimental to bank performance.
Keywords: Banks; Diversification; Traditional income; Non-traditional fees; Non-interest income; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C32 G20 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:22:y:2021:i:2:d:10.1057_s41261-020-00131-3
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-020-00131-3
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