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What drives the greater or lesser usage of forbearance measures by banks?

Paola Vincentiis ()
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Paola Vincentiis: University of Torino

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2021, vol. 22, issue 3, No 1, 190 pages

Abstract: Abstract After the subprime crisis, with the worsening of asset quality all around Europe, a lack of harmonization emerged concerning credit classification, monitoring, provisioning and writing-off in the banking industry. A wave of analysis and new regulations by the Supervising Authorities aimed at highlighting best practices and creating a common standard, in order to enhance transparency and accounting data comparability across the European Union. A point of particular attention concerned the usage of forbearance measures and the classification and provisioning of forborne positions. This paper deep-dives into this issue leveraging on the public dataset disclosed by the European Banking Authority, following the 2018 EU-wide Transparency Exercise. The purpose of this paper is twofold. On one side, we want to gauge the extension of the forbearance measures’ usage among a sample of major European banks and the drivers of this usage. On the other side, we want to analyze which main factors impact on the loan loss provisioning of forborne positions.

Keywords: Forbearance measures; Loan loss provisions; Non-performing loans; Asset quality; Collateral; Credit risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-020-00136-y

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