The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the EU Anti-Money Laundering framework compared: governance, rules, challenges and opportunities

Gianni Lo Schiavo ()
Additional contact information
Gianni Lo Schiavo: European Central Bank

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2022, vol. 23, issue 1, No 9, 105 pages

Abstract: Abstract The governance models of banking supervision in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) have been subject to relevant developments in recent years. These have reshaped institutional and rule designs in the European Union, especially the relation between the national and supranational level. Since 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) has supranational tasks and powers for the direct supervision of credit institutions, while the AML framework remains a national supervisory model with some EU harmonisation of the substantive rules. This article attempts to compare the two governance models by looking at the two systems through an assessment of their current tasks, objectives, responsibilities and powers. The article shows that there are multiple differences visible with regard to the multilevel cooperation and exercise of tasks and powers in the two models as well as divergent ways in which they will develop in future. It also demonstrates that there are challenges and opportunities in the designs and rules of the two systems.

Keywords: Supervision; Single Supervisory Mechanism; Anti-Money Laundering; Supranational governance; Credit institutions; Harmonisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41261-021-00166-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:23:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1057_s41261-021-00166-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/finance/journal/41261/PS2

DOI: 10.1057/s41261-021-00166-0

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Banking Regulation is currently edited by Dalvinder Singh

More articles in Journal of Banking Regulation from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().