Understanding the LIBOR scandal: the historical, the ethical, and the technological

Xing Huan (), Gary John Previts and Antonio Parbonetti
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Xing Huan: EDHEC Business School
Gary John Previts: Case Western Reserve University
Antonio Parbonetti: University of Padova

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2023, vol. 24, issue 4, No 2, 403-419

Abstract: Abstract This article examines the conception of banking regulation through the lens of the LIBOR scandal. The narrative of the scandal addresses the debate surrounding the public versus private view of banking regulation. Employing an analytical framework developed through reassembling prevailing regulation theories that is contextualized to the banking industry, we analyze the historical, ethical, and technological aspects of the LIBOR scandal and subsequent reform. We argue that the narrative of the LIBOR scandal represents a typical regulatory capture in the private interest view of regulation. However, the benchmark reform appears to concur with the recent paradigm shift toward the public interest approach to banking regulation that involves more intrusive and detailed supervision with a focus on structural reforms.

Keywords: Banking regulation; Benchmark; Financial innovation; Financial system; Regulatory capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-022-00205-4

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