The audit of banks in the USA: Has it changed since the financial crisis?

Paul Tanyi () and Jack Cathey ()
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Paul Tanyi: University of North Carolina Charlotte
Jack Cathey: University of North Carolina Charlotte

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2024, vol. 25, issue 4, No 2, 378-403

Abstract: Abstract The most recent financial crisis exposed to the auditors the risk associated with the audit engagement of their banking clients. Because many banking clients failed and investors suffered trillions of dollars in losses, auditors are now defendants in numerous shareholder and regulatory lawsuits. There is consensus that the financial crisis was created by an abundance of credit, excessive risk taking through complex financial instruments, weak corporate structures, and ineffective regulatory mechanisms. In this study, we examine how the financial crisis has affected the audit engagements of banking clients. We examine audit fees, audit report lag, and auditor changes before and after the financial crisis with respect to specific bank risks like credit risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity. Overall, we find that auditors are more responsive to bank risks in the post-financial crisis period compared to the pre-financial crisis period.

Keywords: Bank audits; Bank risks; Audit fees; Audit risks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-024-00234-1

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