Central bank committee decision-making: a systematic literature review and research agenda

Bruno Beltrão Léo (), Maria Teresa Vieira Campos Proença () and Carlos Francisco Ferreira Alves ()
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Bruno Beltrão Léo: Banco Central Do Brasil
Maria Teresa Vieira Campos Proença: Faculty of Economics of the University of Porto
Carlos Francisco Ferreira Alves: Faculty of Economics of the University of Porto

Journal of Banking Regulation, 2025, vol. 26, issue 3, No 2, 320-339

Abstract: Abstract This paper systematically reviews the relevant research issues regarding central bank committee decision-making. The study builds on the seminal contribution of Stanek’s (Comp Econ Res 16 1:103–121, 2013) decision-making framework, which offers a structured, comprehensive, and interdisciplinary approach to committee decision-making, enriching a line of research that previously focused on individual preferences, strategic interactions, and voting rules. It seeks to answer four research questions: 1. Which factors influence the decision-making of central bank committees? 2. What theoretical frameworks explain the decision-making of central bank committees? 3. What research methodologies are used in central bank committee decision-making studies? 4. What are the current research gaps related to central bank committee decision-making? Our findings indicate that both internal and external factors influence committee decision-making, with the impact varying according to each central bank’s policy objectives and institutional arrangements. We also observe a growing trend towards employing more “behavioral” theoretical frameworks. Furthermore, the lack of access to central bank data, primarily due to transparency issues, presents a significant obstacle to research. We identify three major research gaps. This paper provides evidence on how external and internal factors can affect the strategies and outcomes of central bank committees, providing valuable insights for the formulation of appropriate monetary policy.

Keywords: Committee; Central bank; Governance; Decision-making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1057/s41261-024-00264-9

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