Global patent systems: Revisiting the national bias hypothesis

Elise Petit (), Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie () and Lluis Gimeno-Fabra ()
Additional contact information
Elise Petit: ULB, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (SBS-EM)
Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie: ULB, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (SBS-EM)
Lluis Gimeno-Fabra: ULB, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (SBS-EM)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie ()

Journal of International Business Policy, 2022, vol. 5, issue 1, No 3, 56-67

Abstract: Abstract This paper revisits the literature providing empirical evidence that patent offices are biased in favor of their national applicants. If true, this “national bias” would be proof of disrespect of the national treatment principle, deeply rooted in several international patent treaties. Existing investigations are, however, subject to an important limitation: they focus only on grant rates, which in all likelihood is a potentially biased indicator of stringency because it is influenced by economic forces. This paper puts forward an alternative and more robust approach to test the national bias hypothesis, consisting in a detailed analysis of how the patent examination process is carried out for domestic and international applications. Relying on a unique database of 2,400 patent families filed simultaneously in three patent offices (EPO, JPO, and USPTO), the empirical analysis finds no evidence of national bias - in any of the three patents offices - throughout the examination process. These results reopen a debate that seemed to have reached a consensus so far. The lower grant rates of international applications are not caused by a discriminatory bias in the examination procedures but might rather be driven by economic forces that shape the propensity of international applicants to maintain their patent active.

Keywords: status quo bias; quantitative comparisons; multiple regression analysis; patent examination process; patent systems; international trade theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s42214-021-00100-1 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Global Patent Systems: Revisiting the National Bias Hypothesis (2021)
Working Paper: Global Patent Systems: Revisiting the National Bias Hypothesis (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:joibpo:v:5:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1057_s42214-021-00100-1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.palgrave.com/gp/journal/42214

DOI: 10.1057/s42214-021-00100-1

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Business Policy is currently edited by Sarianna Lundan, Ari Van Assche and Anne Hoekman

More articles in Journal of International Business Policy from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().