A critical comparison of the various plausible inter-echelon gaming processes in supply chain models

A H L Lau and Lau H-S ()
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A H L Lau: The University of Hong Kong
Lau H-S: Oklahoma State University

Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2005, vol. 56, issue 11, 1273-1286

Abstract: Abstract An increasing number of supply-chain models are related to the following structure: (i) a manufacturer supplies a product to a retailer—who fixes a retail price and then retails the product to the consumers; (ii) the effect of the retail price on sales volume is dictated by a deterministic demand curve known to both parties. Results from these models depend very much on the ‘gaming process’ that is assumed to govern how the manufacturer and the retailer interact with each other. This paper reviews and compares some basic characteristics of seven seemingly plausible gaming processes; including the two most common ones: the manufacturer-Stackelberg and the fixed-markup-retailer processes. Our results show that: (i) each of the seven processes appear to be no less plausible than the other six; (ii) all seven processes possess some implausible characteristics; (iii) the relationships among the processes are confusing and do not appear to be intuitively logical; (iv) the relationships among these processes are further complicated by the way they are affected by the form of the assumed demand curve. Our results show that in supply-chain modelling more attention should be given to: (i) the proper selection of an appropriate gaming process assumption; (ii) how the model's results change under different gaming processes; (iii) the incorporation of information asymmetry that will allow these gaming-process assumptions to become more realistic.

Keywords: inventory; game theory; two-echelon supply chain models; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jors.2601956

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