Modelling ‘contracts’ between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game

F He and Jun Zhuang ()
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F He: University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY, USA

Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2012, vol. 63, issue 6, 790-809

Abstract: In this paper, we apply a sequential game to study the possibility of ‘contracts’ (or at least mutually beneficial arrangements) between a government and a terrorist group. We find equilibrium solutions for complete and incomplete information models, where the government defends and/or provides positive rent, and the terrorist group attacks. We also study the sensitivities of equilibria as a function of both players’ target valuations and preferences for rent. The contract option, if successful, may achieve (partial) attack deterrence, and significantly increase the payoffs not only for the government, but also for some types of terrorist groups. Our work thus provides some novel insights in combating terrorism.

Date: 2012
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