A dynamic competition model of regime change
Richard Syms and
Laszlo Solymar
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Richard Syms: EEE Department, Imperial College London, London, UK
Laszlo Solymar: EEE Department, Imperial College London, London, UK
Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2015, vol. 66, issue 11, 1939-1947
Abstract:
A dynamic competition model for an oppressive government opposed by rebels is proposed, based on coupled differential equations with constant coefficients. Depending on their values, the model allows scenarios representing a stable, oppressive government and violent regime change. With constant coefficients, there can be no limit cycles. However, cycles emerge if rebels and governments switch characteristics after a revolution, if resources change hands and rebel motivations switch from grievance to greed. This mechanism is proposed as an explanation for the establishment of a new repressive regime after the overthrow of a similar regime.
Date: 2015
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