An axiomatic characterization of the potential decisiveness index

Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons
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Josep Freixas: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
Montserrat Pons: Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain

Journal of the Operational Research Society, 2015, vol. 66, issue 3, 353-359

Abstract: Let us consider that somebody is extremely interested in increasing the probability of a proposal to be approved by a certain committee and that to achieve this goal he/she is prepared to pay off one member of the committee. In a situation like this one, and assuming that vote-buying is allowed and free of stigma, which voter should be offered a bribe? The potential decisiveness index for simple games, which measures the effect that ensuring one positive vote produces for the probability of passing the issue at hand, is a good tool with which to acquire the answer. An axiomatic characterization of this index is given in this paper, and its relation to other classical power indices is shown.

Date: 2015
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