Legal experts colluding with the political and economic elites in justifying corruption: the case of Malaysia’s Madani goverment

Kevin Fernandez ()
Additional contact information
Kevin Fernandez: University of Malaya

Palgrave Communications, 2024, vol. 11, issue 1, 1-7

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the increasing centralization of power by the current ‘reformist’ Malaysian government through the co-optation of civil society organizations (CSOs) to bolster the moral legitimacy of the integral state. We argue that Anwar Ibrahim’s transition from a unifying figure in oppositional politics to his current role has inadvertently led to the muting of civil society actors (CSAs) and CSOs. This co-optation has significantly diminished the autonomy and influence of civil society in Malaysia’s political landscape. A comparative analysis of the socio-economic strategies employed by Anwar and his predecessor, Najib Razak, reveals that Anwar’s efforts towards wealth redistribution and empowerment of marginalized communities have been limited. This policy approach has disproportionately affected rural constituencies, potentially altering the dynamics of political support. Furthermore, the current administration under Anwar faces criticism for failing to fulfill its campaign promise of holding corrupt politicians accountable. This situation is exacerbated by the involvement of two prominent lawyers representing politicians across party lines, raising questions about conflicts of interest and the integrity of the judicial process. Drawing on Gramscian theory, this paper posits that legal professionals should be incorporated into the concept of the ‘integral state’ due to their capacity to interpret, manipulate, and shape laws in ways that often benefit the ruling elite. This theoretical expansion provides a more comprehensive framework for understanding the mechanisms of power consolidation in contemporary Malaysian politics.

Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41599-024-03595-0 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palcom:v:11:y:2024:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-024-03595-0

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.nature.com/palcomms/about

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-024-03595-0

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Palgrave Communications from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().