EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Red, rather than blue can promote fairness in decision-making

Ou Li (), Yan Shi and Kuangran Li
Additional contact information
Ou Li: Hangzhou Normal University
Yan Shi: Hangzhou Normal University
Kuangran Li: University of Southampton

Palgrave Communications, 2025, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: Abstract The present study investigated the effect of colors red and blue on fair behavior in two economic games. Study 1 showed that the color red (vs. blue) could lead to a higher (vs. lower) offer in the ultimatum game, and that this effect was mediated by the perceived competitiveness. Study 2 introduced the impunity game and showed that the colors red and blue only affected offers in the ultimatum game, but not in the impunity game. These findings suggested that colors play a more influential role in strategic motives than in pure altruism in fair decision-making, and color-induced perceived competitiveness underlies this effect. This study presents the first empirical evidence of the relationship between colors and fairness in decision-making and offers a solution to nudge cooperative and fair behavior in allocation.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41599-025-04407-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palcom:v:12:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-025-04407-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.nature.com/palcomms/about

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-025-04407-9

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Palgrave Communications from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:pal:palcom:v:12:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-025-04407-9