Governments’ behavioral strategies in cross-regional reduction of inefficient industrial land: learned from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Guangyu Li, Shaohua Wu (), Heyuan You and Chengcheng Wang
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Guangyu Li: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
Shaohua Wu: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
Heyuan You: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics
Chengcheng Wang: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics

Palgrave Communications, 2025, vol. 12, issue 1, 1-17

Abstract: Abstract Disorderly urban expansion has resulted in inefficient industrial land, impeding sustainable urban development. Reducing inefficient industrial land (RIIL) is crucial for controlling pollution and bolstering industrial vitality. However, previous studies have overlooked the quantitative analysis of the intergovernmental interest game involved in cross-regional RIIL, essential for determining project outcomes. This study employs evolutionary game theory to explore the decision-making behavior and stabilization strategies of three stakeholders, including the superior government and two local governments in cross-regional RIIL. First, a tripartite evolutionary game model was formulated. We then examined the evolutionarily stable strategies and their associated conditions. Finally, case analysis and numerical simulation illustrated the government’s behavioral strategies and their sensitivity to influencing factors in cross-regional RIIL. The results indicate that positive benefits encourage local governments to cooperate. The superior government’s supervision strategy can compel local governments to collaborate on cross-regional RIIL. Optimizing the allocation ratios of the project and enhancing potential benefits can mitigate the negative effects of special funding disparities, thereby fostering intergovernmental cooperation. Ensuring the efficiency of cross-regional RIIL projects requires strengthening social consensus, improving formal institutions, and optimizing governance institutions.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1057/s41599-025-04822-y

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