‘Operative’ natural rights

Emma Harries ()
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Emma Harries: Independent scholar

Palgrave Communications, 2020, vol. 6, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: Abstract There is general disagreement today regarding the philosophical basis of human rights. In order to help give human rights a philosophical basis, this article examines the debate between Joel Feinberg and Rex Martin. Accepting Feinberg’s work characterising natural rights as rights derived from correct moral principles and identified through the use of reason, as well as Martin’s work arguing that valid claims must be recognised in order to function as effective human rights, this article proposes that unrecognised natural rights are ‘inoperative’ but—contrary to Martin’s theory—still existent natural rights, and that recognised natural rights are ‘operative’ but—contrary to Feinberg’s theory—not inalienable natural rights because recognition can be withdrawn. This article thus contains a normative element insofar as it reveals an onus on each person to recognise the rights of others.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1057/s41599-020-0449-9

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