Two conceptions of consciousness and why only the neo-Aristotelian one enables us to construct evolutionary explanations

Harry Smit () and Peter Hacker
Additional contact information
Harry Smit: Maastricht University
Peter Hacker: St John’s College

Palgrave Communications, 2020, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-10

Abstract: Abstract Descartes separated the physical from the mental realm and presupposed a causal relation between conscious experience and neural processes. He denominated conscious experiences ‘thoughts’ and held them to be indubitable. However, the question of how we can bridge the gap between subjective experience and neural activity remained unanswered, and attempts to integrate the Cartesian conception with evolutionary theory has not resulted in explanations and testable hypotheses. It is argued that the alternative neo-Aristotelian conception of the mind as the capacities of intellect and will resolves these problems. We discuss how the neo-Aristotelian conception, extended with the notion that organisms are open thermodynamic systems that have acquired heredity, can be integrated with evolutionary theory, and elaborate how we can explain four different forms of consciousness in evolutionary terms.

Date: 2020
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41599-020-00591-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pal:palcom:v:7:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1057_s41599-020-00591-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.nature.com/palcomms/about

DOI: 10.1057/s41599-020-00591-y

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Palgrave Communications from Palgrave Macmillan
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().