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COASE AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer ()
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Andrei Shleifer: Harvard University

Abante, 2000, vol. 2, issue 2, 113-131

Abstract: There remains strong support in law and economics for three important Coasian positions: law does not matter; law matters but their institutions adapt to allow efficient private contracts; and finally, while law matters and domestic institutions cannot adapt enough, firms and individuals can write international contracts that achieve efficiency. Despite being extremely powerful, these arguments are rejected by the data. Countries with stronger investor protection through the law have more developed capital markets, and find it easier to finance economic development. Weak corporate governance also appears to make companies and countries vulnerable to large collapses. Coasian arguments fail because of enforceability. Absent strong domestic laws and an efficient judiciary, or a tough but fair regulator, there is no way to protect investors. Using the Coasian idea that private contracts can attain efficient ouctomes, the right question becomes how to make it easier for the private sector to write its own efficient contracts. Effective legal reform has proved possible in some cases. Some of the successful reforms to date implement US standards of disclosure.

Keywords: Coase; Corporate Governance; Investor Protection; Latin America; Law Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G30 G38 K22 P10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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