SHARED STATE TAXES AND TAX POLICY OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH TAX MORALE
Agnes Sipos ()
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Agnes Sipos: Budapest Business School, College of Finance and Accounting
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, 2015, vol. 10, issue 3, 65-88
Based on our assumption, tax morale significantly depends on a country’s legal, historical, social and cultural background and circumstances. In the first part of the paper, we discuss the legal dimension of the tax morale – including the interconnection of law, ethics and moral. Furthermore, we analyze the facts breaching tax liabilities under the scope of the criminal law and the actions violating the tax morale but not qualified as infringement of the criminal law. In the second part of the paper, we provide empirical evidence on which factors (e.g. personal characteristics, commitment for paying local taxes, knowledge about the distribution of paid taxes between central and local authorities, etc.) determine significantly the individual level of tax morale. The paper discusses these complex connections either from the viewpoint of law or economics in order to find out whether it is possible to develop the tax morale of individuals, or can the legislator adequately rule the different forms of tax evasion.
Keywords: tax morale; legal morale; tax regime; tax system (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H23 H24 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:10:y:2015:i:3:p:65-88
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