ALLOCATING TAX REVENUE TO SUB-CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LEVELS: LESSONS FROM GERMANY AND POLAND
Malgorzata Magdalena Hybka ()
Additional contact information
Malgorzata Magdalena Hybka: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu, Poland
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, 2016, vol. 11, issue 4, 689-709
Tax sharing arrangements provide considerable financial resources to sub-central government levels. This statement is true both for unitary and federal states although tax revenue sharing mechanisms differ significantly across countries. The basic aim of this article is to compare the mechanisms adopted in Germany and in Poland. It assesses the degree of tax autonomy granted to sub-central government levels in the countries analysed, overviews the principles of apportionment of joint (shared) taxes and presents statistics on tax revenue composition of sub-central government levels.
Keywords: apportionment of tax revenue; fiscal federalism; Germany; Poland (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H2 H7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pes:ierequ:v:11:y:2016:i:4:p:689-709
Access Statistics for this article
Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy is currently edited by Adam P. Balcerzak
More articles in Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy from Institute of Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Adam P. Balcerzak ().