Quantity-setting games with lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment

Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Additional contact information
Kazuhiro Ohnishi: Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan

Philippine Review of Economics, 2012, vol. 49, issue 2, 25-40

Abstract: This paper considers lifetime employment contracts asa strategic commitment and examines the respectiveequilibrium outcomes of the two cases of a quantity-setting duopoly game with substitute goods and a quantity-setting duopoly game with complementary goods. First, in the quantity-setting game with substitute goods, we Þnd that there is an equilibrium in which both the firms adopt lifetime employment. Next, in the quantity-setting game withcomplementary goods, we Þnd that there is an equilibrium in which at least one Þrm adopts lifetime employment, and that lifetime employment is beneÞcial for both Þrms.

Keywords: quantity-setting model; substitute goods; complementary goods; lifetime employment contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://pre.econ.upd.edu.ph/index.php/pre/article/view/884/783 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:prejrn:v:49:y:2012:i:2:p:25-40

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Philippine Review of Economics from University of the Philippines School of Economics and Philippine Economic Society Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by HR Rabe ().