A note on cooperative hunting (Holmstrom and Fabella meet the Dumagat of Tanay)

Orville C. Solon
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Orville C. Solon: University of the Philippines

Philippine Review of Economics, 2019, vol. 56, issue 1 and 2, 73-79

Abstract: This paper examines social institutions and norms related to cooperative big game hunting by introducing these explicitly into the basic economic model used to analyze moral hazard in teams [Holmstrom 1982]. Features built into Holmstrom’s basic model include effort to locate and acquire game, trophy taking and carcass sharing among members of a hunting party. The insights offered here are inspired by the norms of the Dumagat of Tanay in hunting, meat sharing and trophy taking. Among the Dumagat, the individual who acquires the game takes the head and the feet as trophy. The rest of the carcass is divided up along the lines described by Fabella’s [1988] natural team sharing formula.

Keywords: team sharing; team productivity; teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:phs:prejrn:v:56:y:2019:i:1and2:p:73-79

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