A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union

Klaudijo Klaser

Review of Economics and Institutions, 2020, vol. 11, issue 1-2

Abstract: Fiscal policies coordination, macro-stability purposes and provision of European public goods are undoubtedly economic goals of paramount importance when considering the implementation of Fiscal Union at European level. However, there is also a complementary component of moral nature embedded in the constitution of any fiscal system, that is reallocation of resources. The core idea of the paper is that A Theory of Justice of John Rawls can provide a new and compelling basis accounting for the institution of European Fiscal Union in the redistributive perspective since the European Union holds a) a scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation and b) a thick network of institutions which constitute a basic structure. The main outcome of this analysis is a European difference principle. This conclusion is then followed by a corollary: if the European institutions are to be shaped to reflect an arrangement of Rawlsian nature, they should also include Fiscal Union at European level.

Keywords: European Social Integration; Fiscal Union; John Rawls; Redistribution; Social Justice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D30 D63 E62 F02 F55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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