Hold-up Problem in Price Cap Regulation with Limited Ability of Commitment in High Inflation
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Takuya Nakaizumi: Professor, Kanto Gakuin University, Yokohama-city, Japan
The Pakistan Development Review, 2016, vol. 55, issue 4, 947-953
In this study, we examine the hold-up problem under price cap regulation in developing economies characterised by high inflation that have a limited ability to commit. The governments of developing countries are unable to modify the exact inflation rate. If high inflation is brought about by unexpected monetary expansion after the initial average price is fixed, the insufficient ability to show exact inflation causes a lack of commitment to adjust the initial fixed price to the modified price. The study’s findings show that those that have a limited ability to commit cause a hold-up problem if inflation is sufficiently high for a firm to stop production at the initial price, while the hold-up problem does not occur if inflation is lower and the initial fixed price generates a sufficient profit for the first-best investment for the firm.
Keywords: Price Cap Regulation; Hold-up Problem; Limited Ability of Commitment; Inflation Adjustment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 L14 L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pid:journl:v:55:y:2016:i:4:p:947-953
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