Fidelity of the representation of value in decision-making

Paul M Bays and Ben A Dowding

PLOS Computational Biology, 2017, vol. 13, issue 3, 1-16

Abstract: The ability to make optimal decisions depends on evaluating the expected rewards associated with different potential actions. This process is critically dependent on the fidelity with which reward value information can be maintained in the nervous system. Here we directly probe the fidelity of value representation following a standard reinforcement learning task. The results demonstrate a previously-unrecognized bias in the representation of value: extreme reward values, both low and high, are stored significantly more accurately and precisely than intermediate rewards. The symmetry between low and high rewards pertained despite substantially higher frequency of exposure to high rewards, resulting from preferential exploitation of more rewarding options. The observed variation in fidelity of value representation retrospectively predicted performance on the reinforcement learning task, demonstrating that the bias in representation has an impact on decision-making. A second experiment in which one or other extreme-valued option was omitted from the learning sequence showed that representational fidelity is primarily determined by the relative position of an encoded value on the scale of rewards experienced during learning. Both variability and guessing decreased with the reduction in the number of options, consistent with allocation of a limited representational resource. These findings have implications for existing models of reward-based learning, which typically assume defectless representation of reward value.Author summary: Many models of learning and decision-making assume that experienced rewards are stored without error. We examined this assumption experimentally: participants first learned an association between different options and rewards in a simple two-alternative choice task. We then asked them to report what reward they expected to receive for each of the options they had experienced. We checked that the reports we collected matched performance on the choice task, meaning that the values participants reported were the same as those they used to decide between options. The results showed that participants were both less precise (greater variability) and less accurate (greater bias) in their reports of middling reward values compared to either high- or low-valued options. Reports of high and low values were similar in quality even though participants had experienced the rewards associated with high-value options considerably more often. Whether an option’s value was stored well or poorly was not fixed, but instead depended on how the value compared to other options the participant had experienced. These results should lead to better models of how decisions are made based on experiences of reward.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1005405

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005405

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